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Abstract:
The purpose of this research is to examine the relationship between environmental regulation and
economic growth. A four-equation regional growth model is used to analyze the simultaneous
relationships among changes in population, employment, per capita income, and
environmental regulations for the 410 counties in Appalachia. Our results reveal that initial
conditions for environmental regulation are negatively related to regional growth factors of
change in population, per capita income, and total employment. From this, we infer that the
diversion of resources from production and investment activities to pollution abatement is
inadvertently transmitted to other sectors of the economy—thereby resulting in a slow-down of
regional growth. We also find robust evidence that show that changes in environmental
regulations positively influence changes in population, total employment, and per capita income.
Thus, we parsimoniously conclude that in the long-run, environmental regulations are not
detrimental to economic growth.
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1. Introduction
Following the passage of the Clean Air Act [CAA] in 19703, there have been heated
debates on the economic impacts of U.S. air quality regulations (Denison, 1979; Portney, 1981;
Bartik, 1985; Barbera and McConnell, 1986; Christainsen and Haveman, 1981). Despite
extensive study and debate, the relationship between environmental regulations and economic
growth is still not well understood. While several researchers including, List and Co (1999),
Gray and Shadbegian (1993), and Fredriksson and Millimet (2002a) find evidence that
environmental regulations negatively affect economic growth, Porter (1991) and Porter and van
der Linde (1995) argue that environmental regulations stimulate technological innovation and
this, subsequently leads to industrial growth. This view is known as the Porter hypothesis.4
Moreover, the focus of earlier studies has been exclusively on affected industries in the
manufacturing sector (Duffy-Deno, 1992; Jaffe and Palmer, 1996; List and Co, 1999). The
justification for this is that many of the environmental policies are directed at manufacturing
industries, and therefore, aggregate changes in employment, firm expansion or contraction will
directly affect polluting firms (Bartik, 1985). However, manufacturing is not isolated from the
rest of the national economy and as such, the effects of environmental regulations on
manufacturing industries may have spin-off effects on other sectors of the economy which
supply goods and services to the manufacturing sector, and consequently affect the pattern of
regional growth. To reinforce this view, Yandle (1985, p. 39) points out that the ―effects of
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The 1970 Clean Air Act set National Ambient Air Quality Standards [NAAQS] for six major air pollutants:
tropospheric ozone (O3), total suspended particulates (TSP), carbon monoxide (CO), sulfur dioxide (SO 2), nitrogen
dioxide (NO2), and lead (Pb). The CAA was first amended in 1977 and later in 1990.
4

The Porter hypothesis could work because firms complying with state and local environmental regulations will
invest in new capital equipment that improve productivity and at the same time help reduce emissions of pollutants.
An improvement in air quality has an amenity value and that may also affect the pattern of economic growth (Van,
2002; Grossman and Krueger, 1995).
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environmental regulations go far beyond the physical plant closings and worker layoffs" and that
the regional concentration of polluting industries may affect regional development.
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the impact of environmental regulation on
economic growth remains an open question. Cole et al. (2006) assert that this is because
environmental regulations have been treated as exogenous. In the same breath, Fredriksson and
Millimet (2002b) and Condliffe and Morgan (2009) note that the variables used as proxies for
environmental regulations introduce endogeneity bias in the estimation. This is because
environmental regulations can be endogenously determined by a number of factors such as
income, population, and employment change, including other socio-economic factors. This
suggests that an accurate representation in an econometric model must account for simultaneity
between environmental regulation and economic growth.
To this end, one unexplored area in the empirical literature is the use of structural
equations in estimating the environmental regulations-economic growth relationship. The
analyses presented in this study assume that environmental regulations are endogenous and are
jointly determined with per capita income, population, and total employment. Specifically, the
purpose of this research is to address a number of questions that have arisen concerning the
relationship between environmental regulation and economic growth. The questions are: to what
extent does environmental regulation influence regional growth patterns, and conversely, to what
extent do regional factors influence environmental regulations?
To address these questions, unlike in previous research, we assume that simultaneous
interactions exist among county changes in environmental regulations, per capita income,
population, and total employment. Thus, total employment, per capita income, population, and
environmental regulations are treated as endogenous variables and are specified in a four-
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equation regional growth simultaneous model. We employ county attainment status of the
National Ambient Air Quality Standards [NAAQS]i as a proxy for environmental regulations,
and allow the cross-sectional variation of the attainment variable.
The motivation for specifying a four-equation simultaneous model is straightforward: 1)
assuming that environmental quality is a normal good, ceteris paribus, individuals with higher
incomes will support more stringent environmental regulations—thus, we hypothesize that
higher incomes positively influence environmental regulations; 2) changes in population and
industry concentration, including other firms‘ rent seeking activities will result in changes in
environmental quality. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that changes in population and total
employment will positively influence the stringency of environmental regulations; and 3)
enforcement of environmental regulations will result in improved environmental quality and
make a location more attractive for households and businesses. This means that environmental
regulations may positively influence population growth, income growth, and employment growth
and vice versa.
This study contributes to the current discussion on economic impacts of environmental
regulation by using a regional growth model that takes into account the interdependences among
changes in environmental regulations, population, total employment, and per capita income at
the county-level in the Appalachian Region. In order to account for state differences in growth
patterns and environmental regulation implementation, we include state dummy variables in our
empirical model. The second contribution of this study is that the empirical analyses are
extended beyond firms and industries affected by environmental regulations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the analytical
framework for modeling the relationship between environmental regulations and growth, while
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section 3 presents data sources and types. Finally, sections 4 and 5 present the results and
conclusions, respectively.
2. Analytical Framework
Within the context of the environmental Kuznets curve literature, factors such as
population density, income, industrial composition, and other socio-economic indicators have
been found to be influence the level of environmental pollution. This argument implies that
factors that influence the level of pollution also have a bearing on environmental regulation
stringency. From the concepts of utility and profit maximization, it is conceivable that consumers
and firms will respond to spatial variations in environmental quality5 (due to differences in
environmental regulation stringency) and this may consequently affect the equilibrium levels of
population, employment, and income growth rates across regions. These stylized facts are shown
in figure 1.
According to figure 1, when environmental regulations are imposed, firms in the shortrun will incur higher production costs due to investments in abatement technologies.
Accordingly, the diversion of resources from production and investment activities will lead to
slower economic growth in terms of per capita income and employment growth. Another fact
underlying figure 1 is that in the long-run, environmental regulations enable firms to improve a
jurisdiction‘s air quality and allow firms to reduce the marginal cost of pollution control and
production, respectively. Therefore, we parsimoniously infer that the long-run gain of
environmental regulations is reduced production cost for regulated firms and improved
environmental quality. In the aggregate, environmental regulations have multiplier effects in
5

Hosoe and Naito (2006) find evidence that variations in environmental regulation implementation among and
within states have significant impacts on the mobility of capital and other resources across local jurisdictions.
Similarly, the amenities literature show that an improvement in environmental has amenity value, which in turn
helps to attract workers, businesses and wealthy retirees (Van, 2002; Grossman and Krueger, 1995; Goetz, 1996).
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terms of attracting new firms, skilled workers, and wealthy retirees—and this also translates into
increased per capita income for a given jurisdiction.

Figure 1: Long-Run Relationship between Environmental Regulations and Regional Growth
Net Attraction of Firms

Attraction of Skilled
Workers
Better Environmental
Quality

Increased Productivity

[+]
Per capita income

[+]
Attraction of Wealthy
Retirees

Stricter Environmental
Regulations

[-]

[+]

Higher cost/lower
output

Lower Production

Cost/Higher output

Modified version of Goetz et al. (p. 99, 1996)

To understand the above economic impacts of environmental regulations from a regional
perspective, we extend Deller et al.‘s (2001) model by specifying a four-equation simultaneous
regional growth model. We assume that there is a lag-adjustment process between a change in
one of the endogenous variables and the other endogenous variables. In a general equilibrium
framework, population, employment, income, and environmental regulations are not only
interdependent, but will also interact with exogenous factors, including the lagged values of the
other endogenous variables.
The general form of the four-equation simultaneous model representing the interactions
among population (P), employment (E), income (Y), and environmental regulations (ER) are
specified as:
5

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Where

represent equilibrium levels of population, employment, per capita

income, and environmental regulations, respectively in the

county;

represent a set of exogenous variables that have either a direct or indirect effect on population,
employment, income, and environmental regulations. Equations (1) through (4) state that
equilibrium levels of population, employment, income, and environmental regulations depend on
actual population, employment, income, and environmental regulations, including other
exogenous variables in

s.

It is assumed that endogenous variables are not fully adjusted and that the endogenous
variables adjust to equilibrium levels with substantial lags (Mills and Price, 1984). Following
this relationship, the distributed partial adjustment models for the equilibrium levels for
population, employment, income, and environmental regulations are specified as:
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
The subscript

refers to the initial conditions of the endogenous variables, which in this

case are the 1992 values;

represent the speed-of-adjustment coefficients to

desired levels of population, employment, per capita income, and environmental regulation.
Adjustment coefficients are assumed to be positive and between zero and one. Equations (5)
6

through (8) show that current employment, population, income, and environmental regulations
are dependent on their initial conditions and on the change between equilibrium values and on its
lagged values.
After rearranging equations (5) to (8), the change in population, employment, income,
and environmental regulation equations are written as:
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)

,

represents change in population, employment income, and environmental regulations,
respectively. The changes in the endogenous variables are derived from the difference between
the 2007 observations and 1992 observations. Substituting equations (9) through (12) into the
right-hand side of equations (1), (2), (3), and (4), respectively, we eliminate the right hand
unobservable equilibrium values and obtain the econometric model to be estimated. The
proposed empirical model consists of a system of four simultaneous equations describing
population, employment, per capita income, and environmental regulation changes, respectively.

(13)

(14)
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(15)

(16)

The dependent variables ∆POP, ∆EMP, ∆Y, and ∆ER denote county changes in population,
employment, per capita income, and environmental regulation, respectively; where
represent the structural error terms,

is a vector of exogenous variables,

and DUM is a vector of 13 state dummy variables. 6 As already discussed, the lag adjustment
models assume that the endogenous variables do not adjust instantaneously to their equilibrium
levels but rather over a period of time. Deller et al. (2001) point out that the speed of adjustment
to equilibrium levels is embedded in the coefficients α, β, and δ. Therefore, equations (13) to
(16) estimate the short-term adjustments of population, employment, income, and environmental
regulations to their long-term equilibrium levels of (P*, E*, Y*, and ER*).
3. Data
The study area is confined to the 410 counties of the Appalachian Region, which includes
all of West Virginia and parts of Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, New
York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. The data
covers the years 1992 to 2007 (Appendix 1). The dependent variables used in the models are
measured as absolute changes in population, employment, income, and environmental
regulations (1992-2007). County-level data for population, employment, and income are
obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Regional Economic Information System
6

13 state dummy variables are included as explanatory variables to capture the effect of state differences in
environmental regulation implementation and to capture the state influence on economic growth.
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(REIS) and County and City Data Book (C&CDB) covering the years 1992 to 2007. County
attainment status is used as a proxy for environmental regulation stringency and the data is
obtained from the Federal Code of Regulations, Title 40, part 81, subpart C, covering the years
1992 to 2007.
Attainment status of a county is an appealing proxy for environmental regulation
stringency because air quality problems result from stationary pollution sources such as power
plants, factories, farming, heating of buildings, as well as cars, buses, and other mobile sources.
Together, these sources represent production and consumption activities that contribute to
environmental degradation. It can also be argued that county attainment status is an appropriate
measure for environmental regulation stringency because its enforcement is felt by the county‘s
households and firms; therefore, the analysis of such impacts must be made at county-level
(Greenstone, 2002).
Given that a county can be out-of-attainment with respect to several air pollutants, the
environmental regulation variable is an index of the total number of pollutants for which a
county is out-of-attainment. The environmental regulation index is constructed using
Henderson‘s (1997) methodology of summing the number of criteria pollutants a county is outof-attainment. The criteria pollutants considered are ozone (O3), sulfur dioxide (SO2), carbon
monoxide (CO), lead (Pb), and total suspended particulates (TSP). Following Henderson (1997)
and List (2001), the attainment variable takes on values from 0 (cleanest county and least
regulated) to 5 (dirtiest and most regulated)—and generally depends on the number of pollutants
the county is out-of-attainment. For example, a county in attainment for five criteria pollutants
takes on a value of 0, whereas a county out-of-attainment in all five criteria pollutants will be
coded 5. With regard to the ozone standard, when part of the county has not met the complete
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federal ozone standard, the EPA assigns to these counties partial attainment or non-attainment
status. For this reason, counties which are in partial attainment are coded ½.
A number of explanatory variables are included to explain changes in population,
employment, income, and environmental regulations. Table 1 presents the exogenous and
endogenous variables used in the models, along with the summary statistics. County level data
on per capita income taxes, property taxes, unemployment rates, education levels, median
housing values, percent of population below poverty line, and per capita local government
expenditures are included to capture county characteristics that may affect growth. Other control
variables that may explain growth are number of county manufacturing establishments (MFG),
metro counties, percentage of population who are active in and retired from the labor force, and
road infrastructure. Amenity variables (AMEND) are also included in order to capture their
impact on population, employment, and income growth, respectively.
Determinants of changes in environmental regulations are captured by community
activism (Sierra Clubs), growth factors, Democratic Party control,7 percentage of population
driving to work, percentage of black population, and unemployment rate. Other control variables
that may explain changes in environmental regulations are population density, percentage of
population with a bachelor‘s degree, percentage of population employed in manufacturing,
percentage of population who are susceptible to suffer from environmental exposures, and the
congestion that comes from metro counties.

4.

7

Previous studies show that the stringency of U.S. environmental regulations is influenced by the political party that
controls the executive branch and legislature (Lynch, et al. 2004; Regens et al., 1997). In particular, the Democratic
Party is considered to be more supportive of stringent environmental regulations than the Republican Party. In the
same vein, the Democratic Party is considered to pursue policies that are more pro-employment (Levitt and Porteba,
1994). As such, we also use the Democratic Party variable to explain changes in employment and per capita income.
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5. Empirical Results and Analyses
The focus of this study is on the relationship between environmental regulations and
economic growth. Table 1 presents estimated coefficients of the equations based on three-stage
least squares (3SLS) estimation. The regression results reported exclude state dummy variables.8
Based on the adjusted R2 statistics, the estimated models explain 48 percent, 55 percent, 43
percent, and 62 percent of variations in changes in population, employment, per capita income,
and environmental regulations, respectively.
4.1 Change in Population Equation
Except for environmental regulations, all the initial conditions have a strong effect on
population growth and have the expected signs. Consistent with theory, results indicate that
initial conditions of population, employment and income play an important role in determining
population growth in the Appalachia. Notably, the coefficient estimate for the initial condition of
population (POP92) has a negative sign and is significant at 1 percent level. This finding
confirms the convergence hypothesis—which suggests that Appalachian counties which had
initial high levels of population tend to experience a lower absolute growth rate than counties
which had low levels of population in the initial period.
Another important variable that deserves attention is the change in environmental
regulations. Table 1. shows that the coefficient estimate for change in environmental regulations
(ENREGCH) has a positive impact on change in population and is statistically significant at the
10 percent level. One possible explanation may be that stringent environmental regulations result

8

Complete results with state dummy variables are shown in appendix 2. Overall, results indicate that interstate
differences in environmental regulation implementation and economic policies differentially and systematically
influence environmental regulation outcomes and the pattern of regional growth, respectively.
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Table 1: Three Stage Least Squares Results for Appalachian Region
Variable
Name

Population
Coefficient

Value

Employment
Coefficient

Endogenous Variable
EMPCH
2.081
0.000
POPCH
0.451
PCICH
1.885
0.002
2.160
ENREGCH
0.843
0.015
0.520
Initial Conditions
EMP92
0.639
0.003
−0.064
POP92
−0.148
0.000
1.092
PCI92
ENREG92
−0.032
0.104
−0.086
Economic Variables
PROPTAX
−36.747 0.186
−7.376
MFG
−6.562
0.714
22.705
MFGEMP
UNEMP
−211.173 0.037 −96.683
POVRATE
PCTAX
3.079
0.191
2.451
MHVAL
−0.008
0.793
LGEXP
1.290
0.004
0.701
Human Capital and Demographic Variables
ACTIVE
DEGREE
14.536
POPDEN
RISK
RETIRE
BLACK
Locational Variables
METRO
8401.985 0.000 −2611.31
ROADDEN 2329.112 0.570 606.332
CRIME
0.017
Environmental Quality Variables
AMEND
1760.273 0.001 −764.216
VOTE
0.650
SIERRA
POPDRIVE
Constant
Adj. R2
Sample
Size

Value

-

0.000
0.000
0.000

Per Capita Income
Coefficient

0.040
0.014

Value

0.006
0.742

Environmental
Regulation
Coefficient

Value

0.054
0.004
0.062

0.374
0.052
0.000

-

-

0.138

0.000

-

-

-

-

0.000

0.060
−0.382
−0.741

0.002
0.000
0.000

0.002
0.041
0.676

0.016
0.025
0.000

0.575
0.010

−7.019

0.057

0.007
0.003

0.038
0.478

0.007
0.094

0.008

0.000

0.114

−85.830
−1.778

-

-

-

0.004

34.126

0.228

-

-

-

37.907
11.818

0.172
0.006

-

-

-

-

0.002
0.003
0.008

0.000
0.001
0.001

-

-

0.001

0.000

−0.251
0.124

0.000
0.002

-

-

0.000
0.000

0.142

0.541
-

−39.729 0.000
−128.570 0.0807

0.065
0.785
0.834

-

-

0.004
0.969

863.853
99.825

0.151
0.043

-

-

-

9013.233 0.001
0.483

7389.01
0.020
0.5580

0.591
0.005
0.4318

0.003
0.000
0.023
0.006
0.004
0.000
0.528
0.000
0.625

410

410

410

410
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in improved environmental quality and thus make local areas more attractive for businesses and
households. From a neoclassical standpoint, this implies that utility maximizing individuals will
migrate to areas with better environmental quality. By direct contrast, the initial condition for
environmental regulations is negative. This result is consistent with the idea that before firms
adopt air pollution abatement technologies a county‘s air quality is poor and this phenomenon
will discourage population growth.
The coefficient for change in employment (EMPCH) is positive and significant in the
population equation. This suggests that county employment growth (or an increase in labor
demand) stimulates population growth. This finding is consistent with the jobs-follow-people
hypothesis (Steinnes and Fisher, 1974). Also, the role of per capita income change (PCICH) in
explaining growth in population is strong, as reflected by the magnitude and positive sign of the
coefficient (significant at the 5 percent level).
Generally, high unemployment rates indicate economic distress and a dearth of
employment opportunities, and this relationship is reflected by the negative coefficient on
unemployment rate. The coefficient for metropolitan county (METRO) is positive and
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This finding reinforces the notion that metropolitan
counties have an array of economic activities which promote agglomeration economies, and this
may have a pull-effect on population.9 The regression analysis also reveals a significant positive
relationship between the amenities index (AMEND) and population growth. These findings are
consistent with results from previous studies (McGranahan, 1999; Deller et al., 2001).

9

Data from the 2000 United States census indicate that about 57 percent of Appalachian residents lived in
metropolitan counties, compared to 80 percent of the U.S. residents.
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4.2 Change in Employment Equation
The estimated results for the change in employment equation are shown in column 3 of
table 2. The initial condition for employment (EMP92) has a statistically significant and negative
effect on employment growth. The implication of this finding is that counties with initial low
employment levels in the 1990s are experiencing faster growth in employment than counties
which had high initial levels of employment. These results are consistent with findings from
previous studies (Gebremariam et al., 2007; Black et al., 2007) about the convergence in
employment rates in the Appalachian region. Black et al. (2007) attribute the convergence of
employment in Appalachia to the wide diversification of the Appalachian economy.
Accordingly, this diversification has resulted in the growth of the service sector, retail sector, and
growth in government employment.
The estimated coefficient on initial conditions for population (POP92) is statistically
significant and positive, thus supporting the hypothesis that people follow jobs. An increase in
population entails a larger supply of labor. The positive effect of population on employment
growth is supported by evidence from the Appalachian Regional Commission which shows that
between 2002 and 2004, there was a large growth of employment in Appalachia as well as in the
nation as a whole.10 Therefore, it is surmised that the increase in population did not diminish
employment opportunities, but rather was necessary to meet the increasing demand for labor.
As expected, initial environmental regulations (ENREG92) have a negative and
statistically significant effect on employment growth. The plausible explanation for this negative
correlation is that, following the designation of counties as attainment or non-attainment in 1990,
the EPA required states to submit state implementation plans (SIPs) at the end of 1992.
10

See Appalachian Region Employment Report on
http://www.arc.gov/images/appregion/AppalachianRegionEmploymentReport2009Q2.pdf
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Therefore, between 1990 and 1992 polluting firms faced stringent standards with regard to
pollution control and thus shows that stringent environmental regulations negatively affect
employment growth in the initial years of implementation due to the fact that polluting firms
have to install expensive pollution abatement control equipment. The effect of this may
inadvertently be transmitted to other sectors of the economy, thereby resulting in the overall
slow-down of total employment growth.
On the other hand, the coefficient on the change in environmental regulations
(ENREGCH) is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. These results
underscore the Porter hypothesis by indicating that firms‘ marginal costs of abatement and
production may decrease over time as firms invest in efficient technology. The efficient
technology firms invest in serves the dual role of improving productivity and enhancing
environmental quality, such that areas with better environmental quality become important
locations for business investment.11 These finding are consistent with previous studies (Goetz et
al. 1996; Porter and van der Linde, 1995; Ringquist, 1993) in revealing that the short-run effects
of environmental regulation are reduced employment growth, but in the long-run environmental
regulation positively influences employment growth.
Also, the coefficient on the change in population (POPCH) is statistically significant at
the 1 percent level and is positively related to employment growth. This finding, again, confirms
the ―people-follow-jobs‖ hypothesis of Steinnes and Fisher (1974). Similarly, a change in per
capita income (PCICH) is statistically significant at the 1 percent level and is positively related
to employment growth. This means that Appalachian counties with high income experienced

11

If we assume that an improvement in environmental quality has an amenity value, it is expected that firms and
individuals will migrate to these regions, thereby stimulate growth in employment.
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increased growth in employment. This could be attributed to the economy-wide diversification
that has taken place in the Appalachia.
4.3 Change in Per Capita Income Equation
Three stage least squares regression results for the change in per capita income equation
are reported in column 4 of table 2. The sign and level of significance for the initial condition for
environmental regulation (ENREG92) mirrors results obtained in the employment and population
equations (negative and significant at the 1 percent level). The initial conditions for
environmental regulations intuitively mean that an area‘s environmental quality is poor, and this
has the effect of discouraging capital and labor migration. Therefore, in order to bring the air
quality into compliance with federal standards, firms in non-attainment counties invest in
pollution abatement technologies. Investments in the initial period result in increased production
costs and reduced output, hence reducing labor demand. Because of the spinoff effects, other
sectors of the economy will also be negatively affected and consequently reduce growth in per
capita.
Except for the change in population (POPCH) variable, all endogenous variables are
significant in explaining growth in per capita income. Economic theory shows that growth in
employment (EMPCH) results in an increase in aggregate labor demand, and as a result, higher
per capita income. The variable EMPCH has the expected positive sign and is significant at the 5
percent level. These findings provide empirical evidence of the hypothesized positive impact of
employment growth on per capita income growth.
The estimated coefficient for change in environmental regulations (ENREGCH) is
positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This finding is consistent with the
amenities literature which shows that an improvement in air quality positively influences per
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capita income growth (Grossman and Krueger, 1995; Goetz et al., 1996). To this end, we
parsimoniously interpret the initial conditions of environmental regulations as the short-run
effects of environmental regulations due to the fact that in the initial period, firms in nonattainment regions invest in pollution abatement technologies. By contrast, we interpret the
change in environmental regulations as long-run effects.
Consistent with theory, an increase in local tax per capita (PCTAX) has a negative effect
on per capita income growth, because taxes are an additional cost to individuals. Thus high tax
counties will become unattractive locations for households. Regression results show that the
percent of population below the poverty level (POVRATE) is inversely related to per capita
income growth. The coefficient for poverty rate (POVRATE) is significant at the 5 percent level.
The estimated coefficient for manufacturing establishment (MFG) shows a negative relationship
with per capita income growth and is only significant at the 10 percent level. Perhaps the logical
explanation for this negative correlation may be that manufacturing‘s role in the Appalachian
region has evidently declined over the years, to the extent of reducing its contribution to per
capita income growth and gross state product in general.
Again, the Democratic presidential candidate (VOTE) variable is included to capture
political party influence on economic growth. The hypothesis that Democratic Party control is
associated with increased economic growth is confirmed, based on the positive and significant
coefficient for VOTE. Similarly, location attributes, such as amenities (AMEND) are positively
related to income growth, but its coefficient is insignificant. The coefficient for the percentage of
population with a bachelor‘s degree or above (DEGREE) is positive and significant, providing
support for the positive relationship between human capital skills and income growth.
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The percentage of population between 18 years and 64 years (ACTIVE) is used to indicate
the demographic group that is typically considered to be in wage and salaried employment. The
coefficient for ACTIVE has the correct positive sign, but is insignificant. By contrast, an increase
in the percent of population 65 years and older (RETIRE) is negatively related to per capita
income growth. This suggests that counties experiencing an increase in the population whose
main source of income is social security and other retirement income are unlikely to experience
income growth. Another demographic variable related to income growth is the percent of Black
population (BLACK). The coefficient for BLACK is negative and significant at the 10 percent
level. These findings are realistic in view of the fact that majority of the black population in the
Appalachia live in the southern and central counties.12 By all standards, the Appalachian
Regional Commission considers the southern and central counties of Appalachia to be the most
economically distressed region in the Appalachia.
4.4 Change in Environmental Regulations Equation
Estimated results for the environmental regulations equation are presented in column 4 of
table 2. The estimated coefficient for 1992 environmental regulations (ENREG92) is positive and
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. One explanation for this positive coefficient is that
counties which are out-of-attainment in the initial period are likely to attract regulatory attention
and thus positively influence changes in environmental regulations. This is in view of the fact
that some counties will be out-of-attainment in a number of pollutants.
Initial condition for population (POP92) is positively related to change in environmental
regulation and is significant at the 1 percent level. This finding illustrates that air pollution varies
with population and therefore, an increase in population will positively influence environmental
12

Young et al. (2007) examine the relationship between race and economic growth using county level data on per
capita income, socioeconomic, and demographic factors for Mississippi. They find evidence that indicate that an
increase in percentage of Black population is negatively related to income growth.
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regulations stringency. However, the magnitude of the population coefficient is very small. The
coefficient for the 1992 per capita income (PCI92) is positive—reinforcing the hypothesis that
an increase in income increases the demand for environmental quality, assuming that
environmental quality is a normal good. The variable for change in per capita income (PCICH)
has a positive effect on environmental regulation change (table 2), lending support to the theory
that at high income levels, the policy response towards environmental degradation is stronger.
While the coefficient for population change (POPCH) is negative and statistically significant at
the 10 percent, the coefficient for change in employment (EMPCH) fails to attain any statistical
significance.
The EPA considers children below 5 years and adults above 65 years to be particularly
sensitive to exposure to air pollutants. The percentage of the population who are considered
sensitive (RISK) to environmental exposures has the expected positive sign. Ceteris paribus, an
increase in the proportion of the sensitive group of people will result in an increase in the
demand for stringent environmental regulations. Conceivably, community/public activism
towards environmental issues will not only emanate from the population that is susceptible to
illnesses due to environmental exposure, but will also come from environmental pressure groups,
such as the Sierra Club and others. The coefficient estimate for Sierra Club (SIERRA) is positive
and significant at the 5 percent level. These results provide evidence that environmental pressure
groups are pro-environment and will exert pressure on regulatory agencies for enforcement of
stringent environmental regulations.
Previous studies also show that the stringency of U.S. environmental regulations is
influenced by the political party that controls the executive branch and legislature (Hay et al.
1996; Lynch, et al., 2004; Regens et al., 1997). Accordingly, the percent of votes cast for the
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Democratic Presidential candidate (VOTE) appears to have a positive influence on environmental
regulations outcomes. This finding is in accord with Kahn and Matsusaka‘s (1997) finding that
Democratic Presidential voting patterns explain environmental outcomes. Additional information
on the support for environmental regulation is provided by the positive and significant
coefficient for proportion of population with a bachelor‘s degree (DEGREE). These findings
suggest that counties featuring high levels of college graduates are more prone to support
stringent environmental regulations and are likely to lobby effectively against pollution (Hackett,
2001; Kahn, 2008).
Population density (POPDEN) and percentage of population driving to work
(POPDRIVE) are included as explanatory variables to control for the congestion externalities.
The coefficients for population density and percentage of population driving to work are positive
as shown in table 2. This follows because a dense population entails increased economic activity
and also increased vehicular traffic, which both translate into increased emissions of pollutants.
Similarly, regression results indicate that state road density (ROADDEN) positively influences
changes in environmental regulation. These findings support the notion that highway expansions
have increased vehicle miles traveled and this has also resulted in increased emission of
pollutants due to changes in land use and neighborhood (Cassady, 2004). The coefficient for
manufacturing establishment (MFG) has the expected positive sign and is significant at the 10
percent level. This implies that counties with a high number of manufacturing establishments are
likely to have more pollution and thus attract more enforcement of environmental regulations.
To control for marginal exposures to pollution, we include the percent of the black
population (BLACK) and the percent below the poverty rate (POVRATE) as explanatory
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variables for change in environmental regulations.13 Surprisingly, regression results indicate that
counties exhibiting a high percentage of the black population (BLACK) are associated with an
increase in the stringency of environmental regulations. Similarly, the coefficient estimate for
poverty rate (POVRATE) is positive and significant at the 1 percent level. These findings
contradict the widely held view in the environmental justice literature that environmental
regulations are more strictly enforced in predominantly white and affluent neighborhoods than in
black and economically depressed neighborhoods (Melosi and Pratt, 2007). A cursory look at
figure 2 shows that in 2004 none of Mississippi‘s counties had a non-attainment designation for
the ozone standard. This is important in view of the fact that Mississippi contains the largest
number of the Black population and has the highest unemployment rates in Appalachia. These
findings corroborate Gray and Deily‘s (1995) finding that more enforcement actions are directed
towards plants located in communities with high unemployment rates. By the same token, it can
be inferred that more enforcement actions will be directed towards plants located in minority
neighborhoods in order to increase political support.
6. Conclusions and Implications
This study contributes to the body of literature by extending the analysis of the economic
growth-environmental regulation relationship beyond firms and industries directly affected by
environmental regulations. A regional growth model that takes into account the simultaneous
interactions among population, income, employment, and environmental regulations is estimated
using 3SLS. Our findings in this study can be summarized in two main propositions. First, initial
environmental regulation stringency is negatively related to regional growth factors of
13

The environmental justice literature documents that the African American and Hispanic populations are
disproportionately exposed to environmental damages than the white population. Furthermore, the literature
provides anecdotal evidence that shows that majority of polluting industrial facilities is in low income areas—
implying that people of lower socio-economic status will disproportionately suffer from environmental exposures
(Sicotte, 2009).
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population, employment, and per capita income. The initial conditions for environmental
regulations intuitively suggest that firms in non-attainment counties invest in pollution abatement
technologies in order to bring the air quality in compliance with federal standards. To this end,
when firms initially invest in abatement capital, productivity (including labor demand) will go
down, but this will be compensated by a gradual increase in environmental quality.
Theoretically, this means that firms in the short-run will incur higher production costs due to
investments in abatement technologies, and accordingly, the diversion of resources from
production and investment activities will be inadvertently transmitted to other sectors of the
economy—and thereby retard regional growth. This finding implicitly suggests that in the shortrun there is a trade-off between environmental quality and economic growth.
Second, the empirical estimations show that change in environmental regulation is
positively associated with regional growth factors of population, employment, and per capita
income. Considering the fact that the time period for our analysis spans 15 years, we carefully
interpret change in environmental regulations as the long-run effects. Within the endogenous
growth theory framework, firms adopt improved technologies which gradually expand their
production functions as well as improve environmental quality. Within this context,
technological progress enables firms to lower the marginal cost of pollution control, and this
allows firms to produce more with less pollution. Under this assumption, the efficient technology
that firms invest in serves the dual role of improving productivity and enhancing environmental
quality. In line with the amenities literature, improved environmental quality will positively
influence firms‘ and households‘ (workers) location decisions and thus boost economic growth
in terms of growth in population, income, and employment, respectively.
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Like in previous studies, we find evidence that supports the hypothesis that changes in
population, employment, and per capita income are interdependent. In addition, the empirical
estimations show that socio-economic, political, and demographic characteristics influence the
stringency of environmental regulations. The findings in this study reinforce the need to design
and implement environmental regulations that stimulate economic growth and enhance
environmental quality. Another policy implication is that besides imposing stringent
environmental regulations on major polluting industries, attention needs to be paid to other
socio-economic and demographic forces that contribute to emission of pollutants.
It would be interesting for future research to quantify the impacts of spillover-effects that
emanate from the spatial heterogeneity in economic policies and environmental regulation
implementation among and within Appalachian states. Also, empirical evidence that indicates
that counties featuring high unemployment rates and high Black populations are associated with
stringent environmental regulation stringency should be interpreted with caution. Could we be
committing a type I error by inferring that poor neighborhoods are not excessively exposed to air
pollution relative to other communities? Therefore, there is a need to further investigate the
simultaneous relationship between rate of exposure to pollutants and environmental regulation
stringency.
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Appendix 1: Description of Variables and Summary Statistics
Variables

Variable Description

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Endogenous Variables
POPCH

Change in population (1992-2007) A

22862

6196.8

2152.3

10867

Change in per capita Income (1992-2007)

A

EMPCH

Change in total employment (1992-2007)

A

13524

5453.5

ENREGCH

Change in attainment status (1992-2007): 0= attainment,
½ to 5= number of pollutants out-of-attainment B

0.6479

0.2829

Variable Description

Mean

PCICH

Variables

EMP92

Initial Conditions
County employment in 1992 A
B

ENREG92

County attainment status in 1992

PCI92

County per capita income in 1992 A

POP92

County population in 1992

A

Standard
Deviation

53959

25010

0.7334

0.329

2530.2

13630

89059

50945

30.582

62.61

1.1632

0.1326

1560.8

2251.9

4.981

10.498

2344.7

3782.7

0.4410

0.26341

120.53

67.824

11.367

26.236

13528

47631

160.88

285.31

133.03

101.27

Exogenous Variables
ACTIVE
AMEND
CRIME
DEGREE
LGEXP
METRO
MFG
MFGEMP
MHVAL
PCTAX
POPDEN

Variable
POPDRIVE
POVRATE
PROPTAX
RETIRE
RISK
ROADDEN

Percentage of population between 18 years and 64 yearsA
Natural amenities index

D

Serious crimes per 100,000 of population, 1992

A

Percent of persons 25 yrs & above with college degree
Per capita local government expenditure

A

A

Metropolitan counties, dummy variable=1, 0 otherwise
C

Number of manufacturing establishments in a county
Percent of civilian labor force employed in
manufacturingA
County median housing valueA
Local tax per capita, 1992

A

Total population/land area

A

Variable Description

Mean

Percentage of population above 17 years driving to
workA
Percent of families with income below poverty rateA
Per capita local property tax

A

Percentage of population above 65 years

A

Percentage of population below 5 years plus above 65
Miles of state roads per square mile

E
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D

A

Standard
Deviation

5.3388

73.827

8.0139

19.019

17.519

72.362

2.6548

20.921

2.6548

20.921

0.1160

0.32637

1
SIERRA
UNEMP
VOTE

Dummy: 1 = Sierra chapters in a county, 0 otherwiseF
Civilian labor force unemployment rate (percent)

A

Percentage of votes cast for Democratic President

A

0.4687
2

0.67561

3.1947

9.3524

10.065

42.386

Sources: A, County & City Data Book; B, CFR, Title 40, Part 81, Subpart C and EPA Green book; C, U.S. Census
Bureau (Dynamic Business Series); D, USDA/ERS-Creative class code; E, Natural Resource Analysis Center, West
Virginia University; F, Sierra Club

Appendix 2: 3SLS Empirical Results with State Dummy Variables
Variable
Name

Population

Employment

Per Capita Income

Environmental
Regulation

Value

Coefficient

Value

Coefficient

Value

11156
30855
3877.14
10184
4161.87
−101
11618.1
5316.03
1684.52
32857.6
11670.2
3199.48
2414.78

0.000
0.002
0.0001
0.0317
0.000
0.936
0.0000
0.000
0.515
0.010
0.000
0.000
0.004

5375.81
11924.1
−1102.33
3813.67
−1445.22
−1947.62
2981.77
1565.41
4292.67
14151.2
3898.18
−966.087
−427.364

0.023
0.032
0.004
0.117
0.042
0.0045
0.067
0.189
0.001
0.000
0.02986
0.078
0.445

376.487
340.426
−1350.710
1037.711
374.036
0.987
−485.7886
−1167.353
−1113.823
564.9907
−260.281
405.765
−304.972

0.3412
0.3832
0.0007
0.2056
0.4701
11.055
0.2363
0.0053
0.0126
0.4730
0.538
0.000
0.412

0.135
0.621
0.098
0.333
0.213
0.154
0.066
0.448
0.596
0.347
0.235
0.125
0.404

0.225
0.000
0.093
0.229
0.945
0.132
0.151
0.000
0.000
0.890
0.003
0.780
0.00

9013.233
0.483
410

0.001
0.5580
410

7389.01
0.4318
410

0.020
0.625
410

0.591

0.005

0.528

0.000

Coefficient

Coefficient

Value

State Dummy Variables
AL
GA
KY
MD
MS
NY
NC
OH
PA
SC
TN
VA
WV

Constant
Adj. R2
Sample Size
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Figure 2: 2004 Attainment and Non-attainment Areas in the U.S. 8 Hour Ozone Standard

Source: EPA

i

The NAAQS are a set of standards that represent the maximum permissible ambient
concentrations of the six pollutants. To promote public health and welfare, the CAA has assigned
the primary responsibility for air pollution regulation to state and local governments. Thus, state
and local governments administer the CAA by developing state implementation plans (SIP)
which outline how states are going to comply with federal pollution standards. This means that
U.S. states retain considerable flexibility in the implementation and enforcement of
environmental regulations; this is reflected in the variation of regulatory intensity among states
(Levison, 2000). Areas within a state that fail to meet the NAAQS for the six criteria pollutants
established by the EPA are designated as non-attainment areas. A county‘s non-attainment status
entails increased regulatory restrictions on polluting sources, and this, generally, results in
increased pollution control compliance costs. In addition, the federal government can withhold
federal funding for highway construction in non-attainment counties and impose a ban on the
construction of new plants that would significantly add to emissions. Thus, the designation of a
county as non-attainment may inadvertently result in loss of jobs and is likely to make a
difference in whether or not a county will be able to retain and/or attract businesses.
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